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Defendant through his appointed counsel' asked the trial
court to enter an order authorizing the taking of the deposition of
a material nonresident witness; and further authorizing the em-
ployment of counsel practicing at or near the place of the taking of
the deposition, or in the alternative to authorize the payment of
the reasonable expenses of defendant's present counsel to travel to
the place of the deposition to examine the witness in behalf of the
defendant. The trial court granted defendant permission to take
the deposition of the nonresident witness, 2 but refused to authorize
the employment of out-of-state counsel or reasonable expenses for
defendant's present counsel to take the deposition. The first error
asserted in the Supreme Court of Appeals was the denial of the
motion for payment of expenses in taking the deposition.3 Defend-
ant urged that by reason of his indigency his constitutional right
to counsel was denied by the action of the trial court. Held, af-
firmed. The court said it was "not aware of any law which would
have authorized the trial court to direct or to require the payment
of public funds in accordance with the motion to take the deposi-
tion of the nonresident witness." State v. Davis, 172 S.E.2d 569,
574 (W. Va. 1970).
'Defendant was declared an indigent and counsel was appointed for him
by the trial court in compliance with the West Virginia Constitution, which
states: "In all such trials, the accused shall . . . have the assistance of counsel
.... W. VA. CONSr. art. III, § 14. "Such trials" in the West Virginia Constitu-
tion refers to the trial of crimes and misdemeanors.
The word "indigent" has been defined as meaning the needy, the poor,
those who are destitute of property and the means of comfortable subsistence.
The maintenance of the indigent poor is a benevolent or charitable object of
a public character. Lynchburg v. Slaughter, 75 Va. 57 (1880).
-W. VA. CODE ch. 62, art. 3, § 1 (Michie 1966) provides:
If any witness for the accused be a nonresident of the state, or
absent therefrom in any service or employment, so that service of a
subpoena cannot be had upon him in this State, or is aged or in-
firm so that he cannot attend upon the court at the trial, the accused,
may present to he court in which the case is pending, or to the judge
thereof in vacation, an affidavit showing such facts, and stating there-
in what he expects to prove by any such witness, his name, resi-
dence, or place of service or employment; and if such court or judge
be of the opinion that the evidence of any such witness, as stated in
such affidavit, is necessary and material to the defense of the accused
on his trial, an order may be made by such court or judge for the
taking of the deposition of any such witness upon such notice to the
prosecuting attorney, of the time and place of taking the same, as
the court or judge may prescribe. ...
3 In support of the motion, counsel for defendant relied upon W. VA.
CODE ch. 62. art. 3, § 1 (Michie 1969), FED. R. Ciuh. P. 15 (c), US. CONST.
amend. XIV, and W. VA. CoNsr. art. II, § 14.
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The right of an indigent to counsel stems from the sixth and
fourteenth amendments.4 Gideon v. Wainwright5 firmly established
an indigent defendant's right to appointed counsel, holding the as-
sistance of counsel is essential to a fair trial. Prior to the Gideon
decision there was much controversy" as to whether the sixth amend-
ment was applicable to state criminal prosecutions through the
fourteenth amendment. Gideon dispelled this controversy, holding
that the fourteenth amendment requires counsel to be appointed
to represent an indigent in a state prosecution. Gideon establish-
ed a federally protected right to counsel in state criminal pro-
ceedings. When the right to counsel is denied by a state court, re-
course can be had to the federal courts.
The right of an indigent to counsel is also protected in the
West Virginia Constitution, which provides that "in all such trials,
the accused ... shall have the assistance of counsel . . . ."7 Since
Gideon West Virginia courts have been more vigorous in the pro-
tection of the right to counsel guaranteed by the state constitution.
In May v. Boles8 the Supreme Court of Appeals announced that
"the right to the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right, essen-
tial to a fair trial, and that by reason thereof the safeguard provid-
ed by the Sixth amendment is made obligatory upon the states un-
der the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." The
May case is illustrative of Gideon's influence upon state court
decisions.
Mere formal appointment of counsel does not satisfy the de-
mands of the Federal Constitution. 0 The right to counsel is said
to mean the right to "effective assistance of counsel".' Under the
sixth amendment requirement, effective assistance of counsel in-
cludes: sufficient consultation, advice pertaining to the accused's
constitutional rights, probing examination and cross-examination
of witnesses, reasonable attempts to obtain and offer defensive evi-
4The fourth amendment states that,' "[No] state shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or pro rty without due process of law .... " The
sixth ammdment states that "[un all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to assistance of counsel for his defense U.S. CONsr. art. XIV.
r,372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6 See 65 W. VA. L. Rxv. 297 (1963).
7W. Va. CONsT. art. III, § 14.
8 149 W. VA. 155, 139 S.E.2d 177 (1964). See also Comment, The Widening
Scope of State Habeas Corpus Relief, 67 W. VA. L. REV. 234 (1965).
9 149 W. VA. 155, 157, 139 S.E.2d 177, 179 (1964).
10 U.S. CONSr. amend. VI. "In all crimanal prosecutions, the accused shall
...have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
11 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1982); Avery v. Alabama, 808 U.S. 444
(1940); see State v. Tucker, 143 W. Va. 130, 100 S.E2d 411 (1957).
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dence, if possible, sufficient objection to the introduction of
evidence by the state, and the presentation of oral arguments in be-
half of the accused. 12 An indigent is entitled to the appointment
of competent counsel who has the opportunity and time to present
the indigent's case. 13 The right to counsel is more than a per-
functory representation.
14
The issue raised by State v. Davis is whether an indigent's con-
stitutional right to counsel encompasses the payment by the state
of necessary expenses incurred in taking the deposition of a non-
resident witness. Federal courts have dealt with the question of
whether state payment for depositions is required to constitute ef-
fective assistance of counsel. In United States v. Germany" defen-
dant's appointed counsel entered a motion asking for the payment
of expenses for taking the deposition of a nonresident witness. The
issue in that case was similar to State v. Davis, but a different con-
clusion was reached. The court stated, "[a] n essential ingredient to
an attorney effectively representing a defendant in a criminal case
. . . is funds to pay the necessary and essential expenses of inter-
viewing the material witnesses. . . ."16 The court in granting Ger-
many's motion stated that the indigent is entitled to have his court-
appointed attorney reimbursed for expenditures necessarily and rea-
sonably insurred in taking the deposition of a nonresident witness.'
7
The court further noted that failure by the government to provide
such funds constituted a denial of counsel within the intent of the
sixth amendment and entitled defendant to dismissal of his indict-
ment and release from incarceration. 8 "Defendant's indigency
cannot be allowed to thwart his constitutionally protected right to
effective representation by counsel and such right may require that
government reimburse an attorney or advance funds for expenses
necessarily incident to adequate preparation for trial."'9
In addition to Federal case law, Congress has provided for this
compensation through the Federal Criminal Justice Act, and the
Supreme Court has lent its support in the Federal Rules of Crimin-
al Procedure. These sources of authority lend considerable weight to
12 King v. Beto, 805 F. Supp. 686 (S.D. Tex. 1969). See also Williams v.
Beto, 854 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965); Collingsworth v. Mayo, 173F.2d 695 (5th.
Cir. 1949).
1s United States v. Germany, 82 F.R.D. 421 (N.D. Ala. 1963).
14 United States v. Products Marketing, 281 F. Supp. 348 (D. DEL. 1968).
1532 F.R.D. 421 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
is Id. at 423.
17 Id. at 424.
1s Id. at 424.
1o United States v. Products Marketing, 281 F. Supp. 848 (D. Del. 1968).
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the argument that effective assistance of counsel in any meaningful
sense must include this kind of aid for a lawyer representing a crim-
inal defendant.20
The application of federal law to a state criminal prosecution
can be seen in Wittington v. Gaither,21 a United States District
Court case involving a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Defen-
dant was unable to obtain bond and state procedure did not permit
release on his personal recognizance. This prevented defendant
from going to another state to interview a material witness. He was
unable to bring the witness to his trial because he did not have
funds to pay witness fees. Defendant contended that he was depriv.
ed of the only satisfactory procedure for establishing an alibi, and
therefore was denied due process in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. The court, in relying upon United States v. Ger-
many,22 ruled as follows:
The 6th amendment not only requires defendants to
have counsel, but likewise that counsel have an oppor-
tunity "to prepare and present their indigent clients' case.
"An essential ingredient to an attorney effectively repre-
senting a defendant in a criminal case, when it comes to
determining whether that attorney has had an 'oportunity'
to investigate and prepare the case is funds to pay the
necessary and essential expenses of interviewing material
witnesses." Funds in this case were not available to peti-
tioner's attorney either from petitioner or the state. An
essential ingredient of having competent counsel being
lacking there is a 'denial of counsel' within the Sixth A-
mendment. To be deprived of effective counsel is so lack-
ing in fairness as to be a denial of liberty without due
process, contrary to the 14th Amendment.23
20 Rule 15 (c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure reflects this
thought when it says "[i]f it appears that defendant at whose instance a
deposition is to be taken cannotlbear the expense thereof, the court may
direct that the expenses of travel and subsistence of defendant's attorney for
attendance at the examination shall he paid by the government." FED. R. CaRM.
P. 15 (c).
The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 is intended, " [to promote the cause of
criminal justice by providing for the representation of defendants who are
financially unable to obtain an adequate defense in criminal cases in the courts
of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (d) (1970). This art provides for the
necessary funds required by an indigent in presenting an adequate defense.
It should be noted that necessary and essential expenses under the sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel have been allowed only
where the indigent had a court-appointed attorney. See United States v. Bowe,
360 F.2d 1 (2 Cir. 1966); Corbett v. Patterson, 272 F. Supp. 602 (D. Col. 1967).
21 272 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Tex. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 391 F.2d
905 (5th Cir. 1968).
S2 F.R.D. 421 (N.D. Ala. 1963).
23Whittington v. Gaither, 272 F. Supp. 507, 512 (N.D. Tex. 1967).
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State court decisions have acknowledged an obligation to pay
expenses in order to provide adequate assistance of counsel. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Harton24 said that neces-
sary defense expenses, such as experts, medical examinations, scien-
tific tests, photographs, depositions, and transcripts are to be paid
by the trial court from public funds.25 The court concluded that:
[T]he constitutional obligation to furnish counsel to an
indigent can sensibly only be construed to include as well
that which is necessary to proper defense in addition to the
time and professional efforts of an attorney and we have
no doubt of the inherent power of the court to require
such to be provided at public expense.
2 6
The state of Georgia has a statute which provides for the pay-
ment of expenses "actually and prudently expended or incurred
in the necessary preparation and investigation of the case .... "27
The Georgia statute providing funds for depositions applies only
to capital felonies, yet it is in some degree an application of the
federal interpretation of the right to effective assistance of counsel.
The sixth amendment right to counsel as interpreted and ap-
plied in federal jurisdictions encompasses the necessary and essen-
tial expenses of an adequate defense. This interpretation has
been applied to state criminal prosecutions and has been
reflected in a limited way in statutory law. From the cases and
statutes discussed above the trend is to pay expenses required by
the indigent for an adequate defense. Such a payment is necessary
to insure the indigent his right to effective assistance of counsel
and a fair trial under the United States Constitution.
While the principle basis of the indigent's right to payment
of expense as part of his right to counsel is the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, another argument can be advanced
in favor of this right. The concept of equal justice affords both
the rich and the poor equal rights and protection under the Uni-
ted States Constitution.- In Griffin v. Illinois,29 defendant was an
indigent unable to afford a transcript for appellate review. Mr.
Justice Black observed that:
2484 N.J. 518, 170 A.2d 1 (1961).
25 Id. at 534, 170 A.2d at 9.
26 Id. at 534, 170 A.2d at 9.
Vt Ga. Code Book 10A, Title 27, 3001 (Supp. 1969).
28 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. "No State shall. . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
851 U.S. 12 (1956).
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In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on
account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or
color. Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance beats no
rational relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence
and could not be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant
of a fair trial .... Such a denial [of appellate review due
to the poverty of a defendant] is a misfit in a country
dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special
privileges to none in the administration of its criminal
law. There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial
a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.
Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate ap-
pellate review as defendants who have money enough to
buy transcripts. 30
The question arises here whether or not defendant in the
Davis case was denied equal justice and a fair trial because he
was poor.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
should guarantee a poor man the same justice as a rich man. In
reality the poor man does not often have the funds available to
prepare an adequate defense. True, the indigent may have an ap-
pointed counsel who receives one hundred dollars for defending
him in a misdemeanor and two hundred dollars in a felony from
the state for his services, 31 but this sum is paid by the state as a
counsel fee and is not intended to cover additional expenses in-
curred in the preparation of an adequate defense. An indigent
defendant has no means to take the deposition of a material non-
resident witness. Since such expenses are often necessary for an
adequate defense, it may be that an indigent in West Virginia will
not always receive a fair trial in criminal prosecutions.
The Supreme Court of Appeals in Davis properly relied upon
West Virginia Code Chapter 62, article 3, § 1 in upholding the
granting of defendant's motion to take the deposition of a non-
resident witness. Defendant contended that this statute also per-
mits payment for such a deposition in the case of indigency. The
portion of the statute relied upon by defendant reads as follows:
"The court or judge may authorize the employment of counsel,
practicing at or near the place where the deposition is to be taken,
to cross-examine the witness on behalf of the State, the reasonable
expense whereof shall be paid out of the Treasury of the State,
so Id. at 17.
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upon certificate of the court wherein the case is pending."3  The
statute dearly reads that expenses will be paid to protect the state's
interest, but the indigent's interest is unprotected. The prosecu-
tion is suppied with funds to cross-examine defendant's witness, but
this is unnecessary if defendant cannot afford the expense to take
the deposition. It is ironic that the state's interest is so completely
protected while the indigent is left to shift for himself. The court
in affirming the denial of defendant's motion for payment of public
funds to take the deposition of a nonresident witness stated that
there was no law authorizing the trial court to make such pay-
ments.33 It would seem that any denial of the essential expenses
required for the adequate defense of an indigent is a deprivation
of a poor person's right to effective assistance of counsel as guaran-
teed by the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. If
defendant should petition in the Federal Courts for a writ of




33 The Supreme Court of Kansas handled the lack of statutory authoriza-
ton thus:
The granting or denying of a motion to provide supporting services
to counsel for an indigent defendent is a matter within the discretion
of the trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed in the absence
of a showing that such discretion was abused to the extent that the
defendant's substantial rights were prejudiced.




Husband was granted a divorce from Wife, the decree provid-
ing that Husband pay six hundred dollars per month alimony.
The amount of alimony was agreed upon in an antenuptial agree-
ment between the parties, but the lower court held the alimony
agreement was not binding. On appeal, the intermediate appel-
late court affirmed the divorce decree and an award of child
support, and stated that there were alternative views concerning
the amount of alimony agreed upon in the antenuptial agreement.
The three theories were;
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